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Abstract The increasing demand of supervisory control systems connected remotely to critical 
infrastructure and recently the internet, has profiled a high threat level to the security and function of 
control system; more especially Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. It is 
very crucial that operators and management are knowledgeable about these threats and get familiarize 
with ways to trace and track information required mitigating the threats. In present day very 
competitive markets and with high levels of infrastructural investments, it is of vital importance for 
corporations to be up-to-date with their SCADA networks so as to meet the challenges faced by 
remote and/or mobile access, use and cyber threat posed to the critical systems infrastructures. We 
have examined the security implications of having the SCADA system exposed to the mobile and/or 
internet environment. The paper deals with the following issues: Section one looks at types of 
infrastructures and the general functionalities of SCADA and assesses the risks in mobile 
environment. The second section employs some of the recent methodologies applied to the SCADA 
system. Section three reports on some findings from analysis and critically evaluates the risks posed 
to the system using an augmented vulnerability tree approach. The last section draws from the 
findings to re-evaluate, conclude and proposes some solutions on the risk issues of operating SCADA 
in a mobile networked environment. 
 
Keywords: Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, Industrial automation, 
monitoring and Control, automation application, security, risk assessment, network system 
vulnerability, mobile and Internet environment. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Critical Infrastructure is used to best 
describe assets that are vitally important for 
the functioning of a system – organization, 
society and economy. Most computing, 
engineering, manufacturing and controls 
systems are categorized as critical 
infrastructures as their exploitation may 
jeopardize continuity of business operations, 
the environment, security and regulatory 
oversight, corporate liability, human health 
and safety, and stakeholder perceptions. 
Supervisory control and data acquisition 
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(SCADA) systems are crucial to the safe and 
efficient operation of many critical 
infrastructure components which are in wide 
use today and applicable to many different 
industry sectors. The system monitors and 
control industrial systems in areas such as 
Oil and Gas, Air traffic and Railways, 
Power generation and transmission, IT, 
Computational processing, Water 
management, Manufacturing Production 
plants, and many more. 
The general functionality of SCADA 
systems involves receiving field-data 
collected by remote terminal units (RTUs) 
and controlling physical devices such as 
switches and pumps by using RTUs. The 
master computers (MTUs) provide the 
information such as meter readings and 
equipment status to human operators in a 
presentable form and allow the human 
operators to control the field equipments or 
control devices automatically. The MTU 
initiates almost all communication with 
remote sites. Many early SCADA systems 
used mainframe computer technology 
making them hierarchical and centralized in 
nature and required human oversight to 
make decisions. SCADA systems were 
developed for gathering data from long 
distances using poor communication 
systems but providing high levels of 
reliability and operability. MTUs were 
specialized, dedicated computers which 
gathered information and sent control 
command over 1200-baud communication 
lines to RTUs with no local intelligence or 
function beyond serving the master station. 
Very little change occurred in SCADA 
system concepts during the first 30 year of 
the industry (Sciacca, S.C et., al Jan. 1995), 
The recent advances in the communication 
technologies and media (fiber optics, direct 
satellite broadcast and so forth), and 
increased processing power available at 
substation freed the SCADA architecture 
and functionality from the archaic 100-baud 
limitation of the past communication 
systems. 
 
1.1. Risk tools and methodologies 
 
It is mandatory that all devices on our 
critical infrastructure have to be protected 
and the threat associated to them have to be 
identified. After which, the procedure and 
policy will follow, and the technology that is 
required for protecting them can be 
implemented. Risk assessment is generally a 
vast area, which involves different 
approaches and there are many tools for 
assessing the risk in various situations such 
as, in a mobile networked environment.  
Assessing the risk to critical infrastructures 
can be looked at from different approaches, 
for example; the Operational Critical Threat, 
Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) (Alberts, et al., 2003), which is 
a framework for identifying and managing 
information-security risks. CORAS 
(Aagedal et al., 2002) is a tool-supported 
methodology for model-based risk analysis 
of security-critical systems. A Sandia 
National Laboratories report (Campbell & 
Stamp, 2004) attempts to classify risk 
assessment methods, according to the level 
of detail and approach in order for users to 
be able to select the most appropriate 
method to use. The Leontief Input–Output 
models (Rinaldi, 2004) provide an 
aggregated, time-independent analysis of 
generation, flow, and consumption of 
commodities among infrastructure sectors. 
Such modeling and simulation abilities are 
integral to infrastructure risk analyses. 
Haimes, et al., (2002) describe a Risk 
Filtering, Ranking, and Management 
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(RFRM) method, which builds on the 
hierarchical holographic model (HHM) 
(Haimes & Chittester, 2005) to identify 
risks, but then filters and ranks the risks so 
that the risks can be addressed in the order 
of priority. Haimes and Chittester (2005) 
also use Inoperability Input–Output 
Modeling (IIM) to quantify economic losses 
and their propagation through the various 
economic sectors for large-scale civil 
infrastructures controlled by SCADA 
systems over internet protocol 
communication networks. Meanwhile 
(Nozick et al., (2005)) looked at 
representing interdependent infrastructure 
networks using Markov and semi-Markov 
processes to reflect uncertain capacity on 
network links. However, none of these 
methods deals with assessing the risk of 
SCADA in a mobile networked environment 
 
1.1.1 Other methodologies 
 
Recent methodologies by Stoneburner 
(2006), proposes the unified risk framework 
that provides a common language for risk 
management that may be used for describing 
risks. Quantitative risk analysis methods fall 
under the broad category of probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA). A generally accepted 
definition of PRA is a systematic and 
comprehensive methodology to evaluate 
risks associated with a complex engineered 
technological entity. Although PRA 
technically includes a risk identification 
phase, it does not provide the guidance of 
methods like HHM, but rather assumes that 
the designer can identify the risks. PRA 
includes all fault/attack tree analyses (FTA), 
attack tree analysis (Schneier, 1999), event 
tree analysis (ETA), Vulnerability Tree 
Analysis (VTA) (Vidalis & Jones, 2003), 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), or 
failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) (Ayyub, 2003); and 
cause/consequence analysis (CCA) 
(Pumfrey, 1999), as well as methods that use 
directed graphs and logic diagrams (Henley 
& Kumamoto, 1996). Most other methods 
are extensions or combinations of these. 
Many of the tools mentioned earlier 
incorporate these methods to varying 
degrees. To perform the fundamental 
security analysis of computer-based 
information systems, one is tempted to use 
Dijkstra's weakest precondition approach. In 
fact, Yasinsac and Childs (2001) have done 
some initial work in this direction for 
general Internet security, which can be 
applied to information management systems. 
 
2. Effect of SCADA Systems 
 
Recent developments in Information and 
communication technologies have fueled the 
pushed for mobile SCADA systems within 
corporate IT infrastructure. This mobile 
devices technology presents a unique set of 
problems for a networked based SCADA 
system that need to be carefully addressed, 
and in fact more recent studies (Alex W. 
Dan E., 2008) have tried to examine how 
SCADA systems can optimally be operated 
over GPRS networks  
 
2.1 Associated Wireless 
Technologies  
 
Some widely used wireless media for 
SCADA are: private wireless networks 
(analog or digital), dedicated wireless 
Multiple Address Systems (MAS), 
specialized public digital radio networks 
such as TETRA, iDEN or ASTRO (APCO-
25), Broadband Networks and public 
cellular services such as the Global System 
for Mobile communications (GSM) and 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and 
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Internet, providing Internet Protocol (IP) 
service. 
The GPRS is a packet data switched 
technology, using the same Infrastructure as 
the GSM network. The intention for 
developing the GPRS technology was to 
provide broadband access ―on the move‖, 
similar to the wired Internet service which 
uses circuit switched ISDN, ADSL, or 
coaxial cables. Using GPRS, network 
resources are instantly available when data 
(message) actually needs to be transmitted 
across the wireless media. The transmitted 
data is divided into packets prior to being 
sent via the wireless modem. Common data 
applications over GPRS include file transfer, 
pictures, video, Voice over IP, and the 
ability to remotely access and control 
industrial installations. 
 The GPRS network offers data rates up to 
of 150 kbps, depending on network 
availability, channel coding scheme, and 
data terminal capability. This increase in 
data transmission rates with respect to GSM 
(circuit switching method) is achieved by 
using more than one timeslot of the TDMA 
frame. However each operator can assign 
one or more time slots. GSM/GPRS 
networks operate in four RF bands: 
850/1900 MHz (USA and Latin America) 
and 900/1800 MHz (Europe, Africa, Asia, 
Middle East, and Latin America). GPRS 
modems manufactured today, like the 
Motorola g-24, operate in all four ranges 
(quad-band) 
Naturally, not all GPRS based 
communications are identical. Simple 
SCADA devices like standard RTUs or 
standard PLCs can communicate over GPRS 
networks using advanced type GPRS 
modems with embedded IP stack and having 
a PC based server. The network in this case 
is similar to a fixed server-to-mobile cellular 
subscriber communication rather than being 
optimized for SCADA. 
 
 
2.1.1 SCADA wireless network 
performance issues. 
 
When a SCADA system is used over a 
public GSM/GPRS network, users should 
set realistic expectations and must remember 
that there is a compromise between cost and 
performance, since the operating parameters 
relating to data traffic are affected by the 
following factors: 
• Network loading - this might be 
uncontrollable and unpredictable with a 
tendency to sudden increase during 
emergencies (weather conditions, 
earthquake, terror event, etc.). 
• Re-establishment - a disconnected IP link 
might take up to 10 seconds, depending on 
network loading. This delay might create a 
problem for time-critical SCADA 
applications. 
• Data loss - overloaded networks often 
cause messages to get lost in transit and no 
confirmation sent to the sender. These 
events might in turn trigger additional traffic 
and result in even more delays due to 
resending of messages, errors or poorly 
performing SCADA system. 
• Network crash or downtime - while 
operators are doing their best to ensure good 
Quality-of-Service (QoS), the GRRS 
remains a public network and is not a fault-
proof system. It might crash due to attack; 
overload etc. and the service to parts of the 
network/areas can be interrupted for an 
extended period. 
• In principle, SCADA users on GPRS 
networks have no priority over regular cell 
phone users‘ subscribers.  
In some instances, and depending on the 
revenue scheme of the operator, other data 
users (video, news download, games 
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players, etc.) may even be given a higher 
priority access than SCADA users. 
 
3.0 An Augmented Vulnerability Tree 
Approach Model. 
 
The Augmented Vulnerability Tree 
Approach (AVTA) is a proposed new 
methodology, that combines the concepts of 
vulnerability tree analysis (Vidalis & Jones, 
2003), fault tree analysis (Ayyub, 2003), 
attack tree analysis (Schneier, 1999), and the 
cause–consequence technology (Pumfrey, 
1999); to produce what is believed to be a 
more effective risk analysis model.  
Most, if not all of the tree-analysis methods 
are very similar, but they differ primarily in 
what defines the top event. For example, the 
fault tree/attack tree/vulnerability tree 
method is a deductive process, where, the 
topmost undesirable event is first postulated. 
Afterwards, the ways for this event to 
happen are deduced. The deduction process 
results in a tree that includes all failure 
components that could contribute in causing 
the top event. Therefore a vulnerability tree 
is a logical model representing the logic of 
system failures qualitatively. A tree diagram 
is often constructed as a graphical 
illustration showing the stepwise cause 
resolution using formal logic symbols. 
 
In some instances, and depending on the 
revenue scheme of the operator, other data 
users (video, news download, games 
players, etc.) may even be given a higher 
priority access than SCADA users. 
 
3.1 The Steps 
 
In constructing the Augmented Vulnerability 
Tree Approach (AVTA), we have come up 
with the following steps: 
 
Step 1: Construct the base-level and 
expanded vulnerability trees 
To construct a vulnerability tree, the top 
undesirable event is first postulated which 
represents a pivotal event for a particular 
failure scenario. The possible means 
(attacks) for this event to occur are 
systematically deduced. These attack paths 
can result in a failure (the top event). Then, 
each situation (base-events) that could cause 
an attack is added to the tree as a series of 
logical expressions. Thus, the intermediate 
failure events (―attacks‖) are connected to 
the top event and basic events with logic 
gates, the most common of which are 
―AND‖ gates and ―OR‖ gates. In a 
vulnerability tree, the AND gate is used 
when all the base-events connected by this 
gate must happen to launch an attack. The 
OR gate is used when any one of the base-
events connected by this gate is sufficient 
for an intruder to launch an attack. 
 
Step 2: Construct effect analysis table and 
calculate threat-impact 
From the vulnerability tree a list of all threat 
types is created. Each of these threats is 
considered one at a time and a list of various 
effects, or types of damage, is constructed. 
Using these effects, a table showing effects 
for each attack is created. Then, using the 
attack history/logs, the frequency of attacks 
is calculated. A damage/impact dollar value 
for each event is calculated by interviewing 
the operators, engineers, accountants, and 
managers. The probabilities and the impacts 
(listed in dollar amount) are normalized so 
that the values range from 0 to 100. The 
probability of each attack is multiplied by 
the total maximum damage amount caused 
by the attack. 
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Step 3: Add threat-impact index values to 
vulnerability tree 
The threat-impact values from the effect 
analysis table are marked on the 
vulnerability tree. The top event of a system 
without any implemented security (base 
vulnerability tree) will have the threat 
impact index of 100. After security 
enhancements are applied, this value is 
expected to be reduced in the new 
vulnerability tree. 
 
Step 4: Calculate the vulnerability index 
values 
The cyber-vulnerability indices are assigned 
to all the base-events by using the threat-
impact index of their parent event in a 
vulnerability tree. The threat-impact index is 
equally divided among all the base-events at 
the same level. AND and OR are treated the 
same way while dividing the parent-level 
values. Once all the base-events have the 
cyber-vulnerability indices assigned to them, 
the cyber-vulnerability index for the attack 
tree is calculated by summing up all the 
cyber-vulnerability indices. 
 
Step 5: Complete augmented vulnerability 
tree by adding vulnerability index values 
The expanded tree now has graphical 
information about threats, the impact of 
these threats, and the vulnerability of the 
system to electronically launched attacks. 
 
Step 6: Repeat steps 2 to 5 for proposed 
security enhancements 
Security enhancement should lead to lower 
threat impact index and cyber-vulnerability 
index values. However, some security 
enhancements may not result in lower values 
if other vulnerabilities continue to enable a 
threat. 
 
 
 
4. Case study 
 
This section describes the configuration for 
the SCADA test bed at the University of 
Louisville and illustrates how the proposed 
method was applied to the system 
component that performs information 
communication. The method is also 
illustrated on the same component after two 
security enhancements were applied to the 
protocols used for information 
communication 
 
4.1 Vulnerabilities Analysis of SCADA in a 
mobile networked environment  
The research objective of the SCADA test 
bed at the Intelligent Systems Research and 
Chemical Engineering Laboratories at the 
University of Louisville is to evaluate 
operation of a SCADA system under 
carefully monitored and safe operating 
conditions. The specific control objective is 
to regulate the fluid level in a multiple tank 
and pump system through supervisory 
control. Details on the process operation are 
available online (Patel, et al., 2005). The 
communication component of this test bed 
sends the control data entered by engineers 
to a remote terminal unit (RTU) and sends 
real-time parameter values from the RTU to 
the master terminal unit (MTU). These 
message exchanges are done via software 
programs, written in Java, and use a subset 
of the Distributed Network Protocol version 
3 specifications. The component uses a 
client–server architecture where the MTU 
acts as a client and the RTU acts as a server. 
The server waits for any requests, such as 
writing to a file, from the client. The details 
of the architecture have been presented 
(Patel, 2006; Patel, et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Advances in Computing and Technology 
The School of Computing, Information Technology and Engineering, 5
th
 Annual Conference 2010 
 
 
234 
4.2 Critical Analysis and Evaluation   
 
STEP 1: Create the base level on 
vulnerability tree  
There is general attack against mobile 
network communication system which is 
outlined in the tree that can be instituted 
against Remote terminal unit and master 
terminal unit. Hence, the attacks are the base 
event for the RTU and MTU. Any attack 
that is launched against the MTU is a 
specific attack. The attack is then classified 
into three categories in the proposed 
approach: Mobile attacks among the master 
and the slave, attacks against the master and 
the slave, the possibility of an attack against 
the MTU necessitate an attacker attempting 
to trick the MTU by manipulating a control 
message. There are possibly Similar attacks 
against the RTU is classified as the response 
alteration to the RTU.  
The possibility of an attacks on a mobile 
network systems can be classified as an 
attacker trying to resend manipulated 
message (replay attack) it, spoofing attempt 
to send a fake message, (DOS attack).  
Eavesdropping attacks (unauthorized 
interception of information in transit through 
the use of methods other than wiretapping), 
and gaining information by sniffing or 
tapping a line between two unsuspecting 
parties traffic analysis (intercepting and 
examining messages to deduce information 
from patterns in communication), are 
included in the augmented vulnerability tree 
structure attacks are in passive forms and 
they have direct impact on mobile SCADA 
security. 
The tree below shows the base events that 
include the flaws such as nonce not included 
in the response. A message transmitted from 
a remote terminal unit in reference to a 
requested message from an MTU is called a 
response. The Mark in one of the base 
events is a value that is diverse every time a 
message is sent is called a nonce. Message 
that is readable in its normal text, which 
every system can read as opposed to 
encryption, is called a Plaintext.  
An MTU sends petition in a readable text 
which is outstanding as the base events, 
which means that the entire information is 
transmitted in a readable form. The origin 
authentication refers to a countermeasure 
modeled to form the validity of the 
originator of information. A session is a 
form of connection among an MTU and an 
RTU. A countermeasure that is modelled to 
form the validity of the content of the 
information is referred to as authentication. 
A security countermeasure that proves the 
uniqueness of the person who attempts to 
use the system is called an access 
authentication. 
 
STEP 2: Calculate threat-impact values 
and create the damage analysis table  
Table 1 below is listed as a row in the 
damage analysis table which is the attacks. 
To generate columns, show a list all the 
possible loss that have been produced from 
the result of each attack. The duplicates are 
then removed and the losses are put in 
groups. In table 2, the first eight columns 
show the outcome from the loss. The 
financial loss caused while attempting to run 
the operation without the full use of the 
SCADA control system is the loss of control 
or scene.  
For the operation to be run manually it will 
require an extra hour cost for the operator.  
The operation breakdown costs and material 
lost is referred to as Loss of production. The 
loss outcome from idle personnel; which is 
computed by multiplying the number of 
personnel, their idle hours, and their salary 
per hour, is referred to as Loss of staff time. 
The amount of loss done to the operation 
equipment is referred to as Equipment loss. 
Fixing software problems and operations 
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equipments is included in the cost of 
remedying intrusion.  
 
Table 3 (see appendix) gives a summary of 
the attack tree diagram. This is a complex 
tree because mobile SCADA is a complex 
program. 
 
Denial of service 
Flood network, disrupt a connection 
between one or more device 
Control message 
modification 
Seize  and change control information 
Replay  Seize information and send it back later 
Spoofing fake to be an RTU or MTU  
Write to RTU Change or Add data on MTU  
Write to MTU change response and transmit to MTU 
RTU response alteration Change and Add values on RTU 
 
Table 1: Threat Classification 
 
Table 2: Damage analysis Table 
 
Loss of 
control   
($) 
Loss of 
production 
($) 
   Loss of staff time  
(operation salary) 
Equipm
ent loss 
($) 
Cost of 
remedying 
intrusion 
people cost 
$ 
Total 
loss ($) Prob. 
Normaliz
ed loss 
(previous
-value / 
previous 
column) 
total % 
# 
Op 
# 
Hours 
(h) 
Pay/h 
($) 
Total 
($) 
Replay 1,000 15,000 1 40 35 1,400 0.00 20,000 37,400 0.20 8.00 
Spoofing 4,000 100,000 1 80 35 2,800 25,000 35,000 166,800 0.05 9.00 
Denial of 
service 6,000 100,000 2 50 35 3,500 5,000 15,000 129,500 0.20 27.00 
Control 
message 
modificat
ion 4,000 400,000 5 120 35 21,000 75,000 50,000 550,000 0.05 29.00 
Write to 
MTU 0.00 20,000 1 40 35 1,400 25,000 20,000 66,400 0.20 14.00 
RTU-
response 
alteration 1,000 15,000 1 40 35 1,400 0.00 10,000 27,400 0.10 3.00 
Write to 
RTU   20,000 1 40 35 1,400 5,000 20,000 46,400 0.20 10.00 
Total   0 0       0 0 0 1.00 100.00 
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Attacker Goal  Technica l  
Dif f i cul ty  
Severi ty  of  
Impact  
Proble m of  
Detect ion  
Underly ing  Cri t ical  
Vulnerabi l i t i es  
Co mments  
Gain SCADA 
system access  
1-  4 Very low  Lo w  Wireless 
devices  
 SCADA 
transmission 
media  
 Remote f ie ld  
si tes  
 3 r d  par ty access  
 Diff icul ty 
highly 
dependent  on 
point  o f access 
and  securi ty 
measures in  
place  
 Goal  for  a l l  
o ther  cr i t ical  
precursor  
Identi fy RTU or  
MTU device  
2  Very low Lo w  No 
confidential i ty  
 Goal  for  a l l  
o ther  cr i t ical  
precursor  
Disrupt  master  
slave 
communicat ions  
2  Modera te  High  No 
authenticat ion  
 No sess ion 
structure  
 Simplis t ic  
framing tech.  
 
Disab le slave  2  Modera te  High  No 
authenticat ion  
 No sess ion 
structure  
 Simplis t ic  
framing tech.  
 
Read da ta from 
slave  
3  Modera te  Very low  No 
confidential i ty  
 No 
authenticat ion  
 
Write  data to  
slave  
3  High Very low  No 
authenticat ion  
 No sess ion 
structure  
 No integr i ty  
 
Program s lave  3   High Lo w   No 
authenticat ion  
 No sess ion 
structure  
 No integr i ty  
 
Compromise 
slave  
3  Very high  Lo w  No of integr i ty  
 No 
authenticat ion  
 
Disab le master  2  Modera te  High  No 
authenticat ion  
 No sess ion 
structure  
 
Write  data to  
master  
3  High Lo w  No 
authenticat io n 
 No sess ion 
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Attacker Goal  Technica l  
Dif f i cul ty  
Severi ty  of  
Impact  
Proble m of  
Detect ion  
Underly ing  Cri t ical  
Vulnerabi l i t i es  
Co mments  
structure  
Compromise 
master  
4  Extreme  Lo w  No 
authenticat ion  
 No sess ion 
structure  
 Very useful  
precursor  to  
other  a t tack  
  
Table 3: Summary of the attack tree 
 
To compute the dollar amount the average 
loss values are used. Different means are 
used to compute loss orderly. First, Case 
studies and other literature on critical-
system attacks were studied. Specifically, 
the loss was estimated using the data in 
(Rakaczky, 2005). For those who are 
interested in using a large volume of data on 
losses, Its  recommended for  them to use 
the  British Columbia Institute of 
Technology Industrial Security Incident 
Database (Byres and Lowes, 2004), which 
provides one of the most Comprehensive 
event databases record on cyber-attack for 
critical infrastructures.  
Next, used the outcome from the enhanced 
SCADA to find a typical range of loss they 
encountered. Using the data from the case 
study, the costs of different devices of the 
SCADA case study where considered, and 
finally I created the attack tree  above with 
their counter measures I used the same 
process to get the estimate for the 
probabilities. 
Step 3: Addition of threat impact value to 
tree for enhancement  
The threat-impact index value on the attack 
tree is shown in the last column of the 
damage analysis table. They are marked on 
the augmented vulnerability tree .the values 
add up to a total amount of 71 in the tree 
since there is no security enhancement yet. 
 
Step 4: calculate the mobile vulnerability 
index values 
The threat-impact index of each attack is 
now subdivided equally among the base 
events.  As shown in Fig. B, a threat-impact 
index of 27 for the denial of service attack is 
divided equally into two of its base events, 
with each event having an index of 13.5.  
Similarly, since the control-message 
modification attack has three events, one 
third of this attack's threat-impact index 
value is assigned to each of its base events. 
As noted earlier, we assume a simple, un-
weighted distribution, and divide the index 
equally among base events. Therefore, the 
threat-impact index for the replay attack is 
divided into two at the first level, giving the 
MV index of 4 to the base events of no-
origin authentication. The other two events 
are at a lower level and hence each of these 
base events is assigned the MV index of 2. 
 
Step 5: add vulnerability index value to tree 
and complete the tree  
In the augmented vulnerability tree, the high 
event is presents with MV index value of a 
system. The index, which is 71, makes up 
the total MV indices of all the base events 
scheduled above. The corresponding base 
Event could be scheduled below more than 
one attack. Shown in the illustration is the 
completed augmented vulnerability Tree, the 
Threat-impact indices are marked as TI 
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indices and the Mobile-Vulnerability indices 
are marked as MV indices. 
 
5. Case study explanation 
 
• Nonce not included in response: one base 
event with a MV index of 1.  
• Response sent in plaintext: one base event 
with a MV index of 1 and another base event 
with a MV index of 1, giving a total of 2. 
 
• Nonce not included in request: one base 
event with a MV index of 1. 
 
• MTU sends request in plaintext: one base 
event with a MV index of 1 and another with 
9.67, giving a total of 10.67. 
 
• No-origin authentication by RTU: one base 
event with a MV index of 4.5, one with 2, one 
with 13.5, one with a MV index of 9.67, and 
one with a MV index of 5, giving a total of 
34.67. 
 
• No-origin authentication by MTU: one base 
event with a MV index of 4.5, one with 2, one 
with 1, and one with 7, giving a total of 14.5. 
• Session open after unsuccessful tries: one 
base event with a MV index of 13.5. 
• No-content authentication by RTU: one 
base event with a MV index of 9.66. 
• No access authentication by MTU: one 
base event with a MV index of 7 
 
• No-access authentication by RTU: one 
base event with a MV index of 5. 
 
• No-content authentication by MTU: one 
base event with a MV index of 1. 
The complete augmented vulnerability tree is 
shown in Fig. 1 in the appendix. The mobile 
vulnerability indices are marked as MV indices 
and the threat-impact indices are marked as TI 
indices. 
6. Proposed solution on mitigating the 
risk issues of operating SCADA in a 
mobile networked environment. 
 
Two SCADA communication security 
enhancements have been suggested (Patel, 
2006) and implemented on the test bed 
described above. The proposed enhancements 
include the Authentication Octets and 
Challenge–response authentications. The 
Authentication Octet enhancement is based on 
the digital-signature algorithm. In this 
enhancement, additional bytes of information, 
referred to here as Authentication Octets, are 
appended to each message from an MTU to an 
RTU for authentication. First, the MTU 
performs hash on the selected bytes of the 
message it intends to send; which results in 
generating a hash digest. The MTU encrypts 
this digest by using its private key and then the 
MTU sends the encrypted digest along with the 
message. The message itself is not encrypted to 
save processing time duration. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper has discussed a number of important 
real-life issues in the security of SCADA 
systems in a mobile networked environment that 
controls much of the critical infrastructure 
around the world. Many of the current 
vulnerabilities in these systems are either due to 
the inadequate security measures or no security 
in the SCADA network, whether directly or 
indirectly, through the public Network. This 
paper attempts to provide two significant 
resources for systems engineers who now 
struggle to cope with the worsening and very 
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challenging security situations. The paper 
looks at the types of infrastructures and the 
general functionalities of SCADA and 
assesses the risks in mobile environment. It 
employs some of the recent methodologies 
as applied to the SCADA system. The paper 
also reports on some findings from the detail 
analysis and critically evaluates the risks 
posed to the system using an augmented 
vulnerability tree approach. The last section 
draws from the findings to re-evaluate, 
conclude and proposes some solutions on 
mitigating the risk issues of operating 
SCADA in a mobile networked 
environment. 
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Appendix: Figure 1 
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Figure 2: 
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